

Boolean valued semantics for infinitary logic

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- 1 Infinitary logics
- 2 Consistency properties
- 3 Boolean valued models
- 4 Structural results

Let L be a signature. Formulas in first order logic are obtained by induction with the following rules:

- atomic formulas,
- $\phi \rightarrow \neg\phi$,
- $\phi, \psi \rightarrow \phi \wedge \psi, \phi \vee \psi$,
- $\phi \rightarrow \exists v\phi, \forall v\phi$.

Let κ be a regular cardinal, the rules of formation for the logic $L_{\kappa\omega}$ are:

- atomic formulas,

- $\phi \rightarrow \neg\phi$,

- ~~$\phi, \psi \rightarrow \phi \wedge \psi$~~ , \rightsquigarrow $\{\phi_\alpha : \alpha < \gamma\}, \gamma < \kappa, \rightarrow \bigwedge_{\alpha < \gamma} \phi_\alpha$,

- $\phi \rightarrow \exists v\phi, \forall v\phi$.

Let $\lambda \leq \kappa$ be regular cardinals, the rules of formation for the logic $L_{\kappa, \lambda}$ are:

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- ~~$\phi, \psi \rightarrow \phi \wedge \psi$~~ , $\rightsquigarrow \{ \phi_\alpha : \alpha < \gamma \} \rightarrow \bigwedge_{\alpha < \gamma} \phi_\alpha, \bigvee_{\alpha < \gamma} \phi_\alpha$

- ~~$\phi \rightarrow \forall v \phi, \exists v \phi$~~ , $\rightsquigarrow \phi \rightarrow \forall \bar{v} \phi, \exists \bar{v} \phi$.

What can we say in $L_{\omega_1\omega}$?

Connected graph

$$\forall v \forall w \left(\bigvee_{n \in \omega} \exists v_1 \dots \exists v_n (Rv v_1 \wedge \bigwedge_{i=1}^n Rv_i v_{i+1} \wedge Rv_n w) \right)$$

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Finitely generated group

$$\bigvee_{n \in \omega} \left(\exists v_1 \dots \exists v_n \forall x \bigvee_{\{i_1, \dots, i_p\} \subset [1, n]} \bigvee_{\{m_1, \dots, m_p\} \subset \omega} x = m_1 v_{i_1} * \dots * m_p v_{i_p} \right)$$

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Well founded relation

$$\neg \left(\exists \{v_n : n \in \omega\} \bigwedge_{n \in \omega} Rv_{n+1}v_n \right)$$

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$L_{\kappa\kappa}$ -elementary embeddings

$$j : V \rightarrow \text{Ult}(V, G)$$

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Thus, compactness fails even for $L_{\omega_1\omega}$.

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- Fix a countable set C ,
- $\phi = \forall v \psi(v) \rightsquigarrow \psi(c)$ for any $c \in C$,
- $\phi = \psi \vee \theta \rightsquigarrow \psi$ or θ .

Definition

A consistency property is a set S of sets of $L_{\kappa,\lambda}$ -formulas such that:

- 1 for any ϕ , $\phi \notin s$ or $\neg\phi \notin s$,
- 2 if $\bigwedge \Phi \in s$, then $s \cup \{\phi\} \in S$ for any $\phi \in \Phi$,
- 3 if $\bigvee \Phi \in s$, then $s \cup \{\phi\} \in S$ for some $\phi \in \Phi$,
- 4 if $\forall \bar{v} \phi(\bar{v}) \in s$, then $s \cup \{\phi(\bar{c})\} \in S$ for any $\bar{c} \in C^{|\bar{v}|}$,
- 5 if $\exists \bar{v} \phi(\bar{v}) \in s$, then $s \cup \{\phi(\bar{c})\} \in S$ for some $\bar{c} \in C^{|\bar{v}|}$.

Theorem (Model Existence Theorem, Makkai 1969)

Let L be a countable signature. If S is a consistency property for $L_{\omega_1\omega}$ whose elements are all countable, then any $s \in S$ is consistent.

Corollary

A sentence $\phi \in L_{\omega_1\omega}$ has a model if and only if there exists a consistency property S and some $s \in S$ with $\phi \in s$.

Forcing with consistency properties

Definition

Let S be a consistency property for $\mathbb{L}_{\kappa\omega}$. Define the forcing notion $\mathbb{P}_S = (P, \leq)$:

- $P = S$,
- $s \leq t$ if and only if $t \subset s$.

Note that in this context the conditions in the definition of a consistency property talk about density. For example:

$$\forall v \phi(v) \in s, \text{ then } s \cup \{\phi(c)\} \in S \text{ for any } c \in C,$$

is telling us that the sets of the form $D_{\phi(c)} = \{t \in S : \phi(c) \in t\}$, $c \in C$, are dense below the condition s .

Theorem (Model Existence Theorem, S. & Viale)

Let S be a consistency property for $\mathbb{L}_{\kappa\omega}$. If $s \in S$ and G is a V -generic filter containing s , then s is consistent in $V[G]$.

Corollary

A sentence $\phi \in \mathbb{L}_{\kappa\omega}$ has a model in some generic extension if and only if for some consistency property S in V and some $s \in S$, $\phi \in s$.

Generalizing Tarski semantics

Instead of thinking about truth as a 1/0 function, lets take a more general perspective.

Let B be a boolean algebra, the truth value of a sentence in a B -valued model \mathcal{M} is a function

$$\phi \mapsto [\phi]_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{M}} \in B.$$

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$$\phi \mapsto [\phi]_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{M}} \in B.$$

$$[\neg\phi]_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{M}} = \neg[\phi]_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{M}}$$

$$[\bigvee \Phi]_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{M}} = \bigvee_{\phi \in \Phi} [\phi]_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{M}}$$

$$[\bigwedge \Phi]_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{M}} = \bigwedge_{\phi \in \Phi} [\phi]_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{M}}$$

$$[\exists v \phi(v)]_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{M}} = \bigvee_{m \in M} [\phi(m)]_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{M}}$$

$$[\forall v \phi(v)]_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{M}} = \bigwedge_{m \in M} [\phi(m)]_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathcal{M}}$$

Full boolean valued models

It might happen that \mathcal{M} is a B -valued model realizing an existential sentence,

$$[\exists v \phi(v)]_B^{\mathcal{M}} = 1_B,$$

but for no $m \in M$,

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Definition

A B -valued model \mathcal{M} is full if for every existential formula $\exists v \phi(v)$ there exists some $m \in M$ such that

$$[\exists v \phi(v)]_B^{\mathcal{M}} = [\phi(m)]_B^{\mathcal{M}}.$$

Model existence theorems

Theorem (Model Existence Theorem, Mansfield 1972)

Let S be a consistency property for $\mathbb{L}_{\kappa\kappa}$. For any $s \in S$ there exists \mathcal{M} a boolean valued model realizing s ,

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Completeness

Theorem (Boolean Completeness for $\mathbb{L}_{\kappa\kappa}$, Mansfield)

The following are equivalent for T, S sets of $\mathbb{L}_{\kappa\kappa}$ -formulae.

- 1 $T \models_{\text{BVM}} S$,
- 2 $T \vdash S$.

Theorem (Boolean Completeness for $\mathbb{L}_{\kappa\omega}$, S. & Viale)

The following are equivalent for T, S sets of $\mathbb{L}_{\kappa\omega}$ -formulae.

- 1 $T \models_{\text{Sh}} S$,
- 2 $T \models_{\text{BVM}} S$,
- 3 $T \vdash S$.

Craig's interpolation

Theorem (Boolean Craig Interpolation for $L_{\kappa,\lambda}$)

Assume $\models_{\text{BVM}} \phi \rightarrow \psi$ with $\phi, \psi \in L_{\kappa,\lambda}$. Then there exists a sentence θ in $L_{\kappa,\lambda}$ such that

- $\models_{\text{BVM}} \phi \rightarrow \theta, \models_{\text{BVM}} \theta \rightarrow \psi,$
- *all non logical symbols appearing in θ appear both in ϕ and ψ .*

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Omitting types theorems

Theorem (Boolean Omitting Types Theorem for $L_{\kappa,\lambda}$, S. & Viale)

Let T be a boolean satisfiable $L_{\kappa,\lambda}$ -theory. Let $\Sigma(\bar{v})$ be an $L_{\kappa,\lambda}$ type and assume that it is not isolated by an $L_{\kappa,\lambda}$ -sentence modulo T . Then there exists a boolean valued model \mathcal{M} such that:

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Let T be a boolean satisfiable $L_{\kappa\omega}$ -theory. Let $\Sigma(v)$ be an $L_{\kappa\omega}$ -type and assume that it is not isolated by an $L_{\kappa\omega}$ -sentence modulo T . Then there exists a full boolean valued model \mathcal{M} such that:

- $\mathcal{M} \models T$ and \mathcal{M} omits Σ .